RECENT CASES.
AGL.cY-K.oWU%L,,E

OF AGENT-,VHEN IMPUTED TO

PjihCjP.L-Whefn a

man has mnde a statement untrue to his knowledge to induce another whom
be does not believe to know its untruth to act upon it, and that other has
acted upon it in ignorance and to his damage, the maker of the representation cannot succeed in a defence to an action for fraudulent misrepresentations by proving that an agent of the other through whom he sent the statement knew of its untruth, the knowledge of the agent not being acquired in
the course of employment. Wells v. Smith, i IL T. 8o9 (Eng. 1914).
Notice to. or knowledge of an agent while acting within the scope of his
authority and in reference to a matter over which his authority extends, is
notice to. or knowledge of the principal. Armstrong v. Ashley, 204 U. S.
272 (19o6) ; Edson & Foulke Co. v. Winsell. i6o Cal. 783 (x911). There are
two theories upon which this rule is based: (j) The legal identity of the
agent with the principal during the continuance of the agency. Boursot v.
Savage, L R. 2 Eq. 134 (Eng. 1866); Hall & Brown Woodworking Machine
Co. v. Haley Furn. & M.Nfg. Co., 174 Ala. rgo (19i"). Under this theory,
only such notice or knowledge as conies to the agent, while he is agent, may
he imputed to the principal. Teagarden v. Godley Lumber Co. 154 S. NV.
(2) It is
Rep. 973 (Tex. 1913); Meyers v. Gerhart, 1.4 Wash. 657 (19o9).
the duty of the agent to disclose to his principal all notice or knowledge
which he may possess and which appears to be necessary for the principal's
protection or guidance and this duty, the law conclusively presumes the agent
to have performed. The Distilled Spirits, it Wall. 367 (U. S. £87o); Cabin
Branch Mining Co. v. Hutchinson, 12 Va. 37 (19i). Under this view, it is
immaterial when the agent obtained the information if he possessed it while
acting as agent. Thus, according to the weight of authority, notice or knowledge which the agent may have acquired prior to the existence of the
agency, but which he has in mind while agent, will be imputed to the principal. Henry v. Omaha Packing Co., 8I Neb. 237 (19o8); Brothers v. Bank
of Kaukauna. 84 Wis. 381 (1893). However, notice coming to an agent even
while acting generally in the execution of his agency, but which has no such
present relevancy or importance as to impose a duty to communicate i or
where there is a duty not to disclose it, would not be imputed to the
principal. Fidelity & Deposit Co. Y. Courtney, I86 U. S. 342 (igoi); Melms
If a person colludes with an
v. Pabst Brewing Co.. 93 Wis. 153 (1896).
agent to cheat the principal, the latter is not responsible for the knowledge
or notice of the agent. Van Buren Co. v. Surety Co., 137 Iowa, 490 (19o8).
Ac;ENcY-SALE rY A-GE !T To HiMsF.LF-Bona Fides-omplainants were
tie selling agents of the defendants. The compensation of the complainants
was stipulated to be all they might realize on a sale over and above the
minimum selling price. Complainants sold the lots to themselves but defendants refused to convey upon tender of the minimum selling price. Held:
Inasmuch as the purchase of the property by complainants would be in
nowise inconsistent with their duty as agents of the defendants, they had a
right to purchase the property on their own account. Hutton v. Sherrard,
15o N. \%. Rep. 135 (Mich. 1914).
As a general rule, an agent authorized to sell his principal's property
may not, without the latter's consent, become the purchaser. Paige v. Akins,
12 CaL 401 (i89f6) : George N. Pierce Co. v. Beers, 19o Mass. xgg (£9o6).
The reason for the rule is that the position of buyer and seller are diametrically
opposed and the paramount and vital principle of all agencies being good
faith, the law will not permit an agent to put himself in a position antagonistic to that of his principal. 'Meek v. Hurst, 223 Mo. 688 (igog); RobertThe fact that the agent's motive
son v. Chapman, 152 U. S. 673 (t894).

(564)

RECENT CASES
was honorable, or that he charged himself with the fair market value of the
property, will make no difference if the principal chooses to repudiate the
sale. Burke v. Bours. 92 Cal. io8 (189); Tyler v. Sanborn, 128 111. 136
( 1889). Nor can the purchase by the agent be sustained even if at a price
named by the principal as one at which he is willing to sell. Porter v.
Woodruff, 36 N. J. Eq. 174 (1882): Rich v. Black and Baird. j73 Pa. 92
m8,)). But see contra. Selover v. Isle Harbor Land Co., 91 Minn. 451
(1904). It is immaterial also that the sale at which the agent purchases is
a public one. Rockford Watch Co. v. Manifold, 36 Neb. 8ot (1893). But
where the agent purchases directly or indirectly the property which he is
authorized to sell, the transaction may be ratified by the principal and after
such ratification, his right to have the sale declared a nullity is lost. Marsh
v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. i;8 (i874): Vadsworth v.Gay, 118 Mass. 44 (1875).
Purchase by an agent at his own sale is not open to attack by anyone except
the principal. Eastern Bank v. Taylor, 41 Ala. Too (t867). Where an agent
is authorized to sell at a set price, and is to receive all that he can get
over and above that price, as in the principal case. it would seem that there
would then be no conflict between the interest of the principal and the
interest of the agent, and the agent should be allowed to sell to himself
at the set price without disclosing to his principal that he is the purchaser.
Synnott v. Shaughnessy, 7 Pac. Rep. & (Idaho, 1885).
BAtLMExT-EXPENSS--ORDNARY

AND

EXTRAORDINARY

REPAIRS-The

owner of a grading outfit leased it tinder a contract silent as to who should
pay the cost of putting the outfit in good condition, the ordinary repairs inci(lent to its use. or the extraordinary repairs inuring to the use of the
bailor. Held: The bailor is liable for extraordinary repairs necessary to put
the outfit in condition and inuring to the bailor's benefit, such repairs not
being necessitated by any fault of the bailee; the bailee should bear the
ordinary expenses incidental to the use of the outfit; whether the bailor or
bailee is liable for the ordinary expense incident to keeping it in repair
depends on the comlpensation, the character of the property and custom.
German-American Bank of Seattle v. Normile, To Pac. Rep. 289 (Wash.
1914).
At common law, in the absence of an express contract, whether the
bailor or the bailee is bound to pay the ordinary expenses incident to keeping the article hired in a state of repair while in the custody of the bailee
depends largely upon custom and usage and the character of the article.
Trust Co. v. Wabash, etc.. R. Co.. 5o Fed. Rep. 857 (189z). Where the
article is not suitable for use when delivered to the bailce.the expense of
naking it suitable is chargeable to the bailor. Southern Iron, etc., Co. v.
Smith, 16. S.W. Rep. 804 ( Mo. 1914). And if the article has an inherent
defect which renders it unfit for use the bailee is not liable therefor.
Williamson v. Phillipoff, 66 Fla. 549, 64 So. Rep. 269 (1914). But a bailee
is liable for the cost of repair of damages ca'used by his use. Southern Iron,
etc.. Co. v. Smith, supra.
A bailor who binds himself to keel) a bailed article in perfect repair
without any further charges whatever, is liable for repairs made necessary
by an accident not caused by the wilful conduct of the bailee. Reading v.
Menham, i M. & Rob. 234 (Eng. 1832). So also a bailee, tinder a contract
requiring him to return the article bailed in good condition, ordinary wear
and tear excepted, is not entitled to recover the cost of repairing the article
after an accident. Pacific Bridge Co. v. Riverside Rock Co., 141 Pac. Rep.
751 (Ore. 1914).
BiLLs AND 'NOTFs-Us'R, AS A IDFF..cE-A statute provided a penalty
for usury. and provided also that the assignee of a usurious contract ingood
faith and without notice might recover from the usurer. Held: Under this
statute usury is a defence to the maker of a note against a holder in due
course. Perry Savings Bank v. Fitzgerald, 149 N. W. Rep. 497 (Ia. 1914).
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But before and after the Negotiable Instruments Law, it has been held
very generally that a negotiable contract will be enforced at the suit of a
bona fide holder, notwithstanding the instrument would be unenforceable
between the original parties by virtue of statutory enactment, unless the
.tatute expressly or inipliedly declares the contract utterly void and of no
effect. Hopmeyer v. Frederick, 74 Ill. App. 431 (1897); Buthenthal v.
There is. however, authority to the conColumbia, 175 Ala. 398 (912).
trary, at common law and under the act. Exchange Bank Y. Henderson,
13o Ga. 26o (1913); Keene v. Behan. 40 Wash. 5o5 (i9o5).

But when the

statute, expressly or by necessary implication, declares the instrument absoItitely void. prior to the act the rule was quite universally accepted that
there could not be recovery even by the innocent purchaser for value.
Taylor v. Atchison, 54 11. 196 (187o); Unger v. Boas. 13 Pa. 6oo (8.5o).
As a general rule all coniracts founded on consideration which embrace an
act which the law prohibits under a penalty, are considered to be in the
same class as those which are expressly declared by statute to be void.
Woods v. Armstrong, 54 Ala. 15o (i875). The principal case shows an
example of the latter class of contract, inasmuch as the Iowa statute did
not specifically render void a contract founded upon a usurious consideration, but inflicted a penalty for usury.
Since the Negotiable Instruments Law, however, there has been a conflict of decisions which has rendered doubtful the question Whether 'a
holder in due course may recover upon an instrument based on a void
consideration. By some courts it is held that the act has not changed the
former rule. Alexander v. Hazelrigg. 123 Ky. 677 (I9O6): Western Bank
v. State Bank,- 18 CoL App. 128 (t9o2). The contrary opinion is that since
the act provides that a holder in due course takes free from defect of
title of prior parties, the former voiding statute is repealed by necessary
implication. Wirt v. Stubblefield, 17 App. D. C. 283 (i9oo); Klar v.
Kostink, 119 N. Y. Supp. 683 (19o9). On principle, the former view semns
the better.
CONSTITtTION.AL Lw-FREEOs

OF CO.-rMACT-LAnOR Uxioxs-A Kansas

statute made it a misdemeanor for an employer to require, as a condition
of enployment, that the employee should not belong to a labor union. Held:
Such a statute is unconstitutional as an unjustifiable interference with the
right of the employer, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to hire whom he
plea.es and attach such conditions to the employment as he wishes. Coppage
v. Kansas. 236 U. S. 1 (15).
The court properly considered itself bound by the Adair case, which had
held inconstitutional a law of Congress forbidding an employer discharging
an employee for membership in a labor union. Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S.
16i (zoo ). Nor would the court uphold the statute as a proper exercise of
the police power of the state. There seemed to be noticeable lack of proof
that the existence of labor unions and membership therein was generally
beneficial to the public welfare. The court said that the only way the statute
could be considered thus beneficial was to say that "leveling the inequalities
of fortune by depriving one who has property of some part of what is
characterized as 'financial independence'" was such a benefit. This striking
down personal liberty and property, denied to the statute by the Fourteenth
Amendment, is all that the statute does. Thus the court say -interference
with the normal exercise of personal liberty and property rights is the
primary object of the statute and not an incident to the advancement of the
general welfare."
Holmes. J., dissented on ground that membership in a labor union might
be at least thought necessary "'to establish the equality of position between
the pai'ies in which liberty of contract begins." See Mr. Justice Holmes dissent in the Adair case also. The two dissenting opinions show at least a
possile belief in the general good to be derived from labor unions. Day, J.,
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strongly dissenting also (Ilughes, J., concurring), emphasized the fact that
it was prima facie for the legislature to say what was for the public welfare
and that this statute showed no arbitrary abuse of such privilege.
Taken all in all the conflicting opinions are those which usually arise
when the police power of the State and the Fourteenth Amendment come
into conflict. Whether the statute is or is not for the public welfare and
just how much weight should be given to the fact that the State legislature
evidently believes it to be for the public welfare, are questions which give

rise to legitimate differences of opinion.

Fundamentally Coppage v. Kansas

represents nothing more than such a difference of opinion.
CONTRAcTs-CoNSIDr.ATiox-A fter a contract had been rescinded by
agreement of the parties, a new agreement was substituted. Held: The
new agreement was not void for want of consideration. Credit, Clearance
Bureau v. Hochban Contracting Co., i44 Pac. Rep. 315 (Cal. 1914).

The doing of, or the promise to do, something which a person is already

bound by law or by subsisting contract to do, is no consideration for a

promise made to that person in order to induce him to perform or to
promise to perform what he is bound to do. Carpenter v. Taylor, 164 N. Y.
171 (19oo).
But though this is undoubtedly the general rule, the courts have
declared it inapplicable in many cases apparently within its provisions. There
are in the main two classes of these cases. In the lirst, it is held that the
new promise is a rescission of the old contract and the formation of a new
and different agreement by the parties. The reasoning is that where a party
has broken his contract and refused to perform it, it is optional with the
other party to sue him for damages, or to waive the breach and enter into
a new contract with the delinquent party: if the latter is done, it is regarded
that the release of one from the stipulations of the original agreement is
the consideration for the release of the other, and th-mfiutual releases are
the consideration for the new contract, sufficient to give it full legal effect.
Scanlon v. Northwood. 147 Mich. 139 (19O7); Parrot v. R. Co., -07 Mass.
184 (191). This reasoning .vas apparently one of the elements entering
into the decision in the principal case. In the second class of cases referred
to, it is held that where the refusal to perform was equitable and fair,
and the difficulties in the way of performance were substantial, and not
within the contemplation of the parties when the original contract was made,
a new promise to pay an additional sum or to. grant a further benefit is
valid. Linz v. Schuck. io6 Md. 220 (1907).
In the principal case there was a further element involved, in that
there was apparently a dispute between the parties as to whether the contract had been induced by misrepresentation. If there was a bona fide
dispute concerning the validity of the old contract, a new contract entered
into for the purpose of settling that dispute would undoubtedly be supported
by legal consideration. The compromise of a claim which is asserted in
good faith and under color of right is binding on the parties when the
claim is doubtful, and the compromise made in settlement of a dispute,
even though it may ultimately be found that the claimant could not have
prevailed. Union Collection Co. v. Buckman, i5o Cal. 159 (19o7); Hulse v.
Hulse, 155 11. App. 343 (I9O).
CORPORA.TioNs-RIGHT OF STOCKHOLDER TO INSPECT BooKs-A stockholder
of a corporation filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against/the corporation and its officers to produce the books of the company for his

inspection, averring fraud and mismanagement of the affairs of the corporation. The writ was allowed. Rochester v. Indiana Gas Co., 92 AtL Rep.
717 (Pa. 1914).

This decision represents the universal rule that the stockholders of a
corporation have a right by the common law to examine the books of the
corporation at any reasonable time, and for any reasonable purpose. Com.
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v. Phoenix Iron Co., io5 Pa. iii (z884); Stone v. Kellogg, x65 III. 192
(1&6); Huylar v. Craigin Cattle Co., 40 N. J. Eq. 392 (i895); Guthrie v.
Harkness, ip9 U. S. 148 (i9o5). In this connection the following purposes
have been held reasonable: Where the stockholder honestly believes that the
company is being mismanaged, as in the principal case. Varney v. Baker,
194 Mass. 239 (1907). Where he wants information to enable him to bring
a bill in equity against the directors to obtain relief against the abuses of
which he complains. Coin. v. Phoenix Iron Co., supra. Where he wishes
to ascertain the value of his stock which he wishes in good faith to sell
Garcin v. Trenton, etc., Co., 6o Atl. Rep. 1o98 (N. J. x9o5). Or to ascertain
who are stockholders with a view to canvassine their votes for an eleition.
People v. t.adie, 6.3 lit", 320 (N. Y. 1892). In general a mandamus will
i-sue where some property right is involved, or some controversy exists, or
some valuable interest is in question to settle which an inspection of the
books is necessary. Ellsworth v. Dorwart, 95 Iowa, io8 (1895).
was stated in Phoenix Iron Co. v. Corn., 113 Pa. 563 (1884),
"suchButa as
right is of course not to be exercised to gratify curiosity, or for
speculative purposes". Accordingly the writ has been denied in the following cases: To obtain information for the benefit of a rival concern. Bevier
v. United, etc., Co., 69 At. Rep. ioo8 (N. J. i9o8). To give information
to a competing concern. People v. Consol Fire Alarm Co., 145 App. Div.
427 (N. Y. 1911). In general a mandamus will not issue where the purpose is opposed to rather than for the protection of the corporation's
interests.
Where, however, a statute gives the right to inspect the books to stockholders the writ of mandamus seems to be granted as a matter of right
regardless of the purpose for which it is desired. Venner v. Chicago, etc.,
Ry. Co., 246 Il1. 17o (igTo) ; People v. Consol. Nat. Bank, supra.
CRIMIALL LAkW-SALE OF INTOXICATING LiQUos-SocIlA. CLUBS-A
social fraternal order purchased liquors and disposed of same to members
of the order by selling coupons to them good in exchange for definite quantities of liquor according to a fixed schedule. The steward of the lodge,
when present, would deliver to coupon holding members such liquors as
they might desire, the members depositing coupons for same in a receptacle
provided therefor. When the steward was not present the members frequently helped themselves, depositing the coupons according to the schedule.
The steward was indicted for keeping a place where intoxicating liquors
were sold in violation of law. and for having liquors in his possession for
such purpose. Hleld: The defendant is guilty under an act providing that any
person who shall keep, run or operate a place where intoxicating liquors are
sold in violation of law, or shall be found in possession of such liquors for
such purpose, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. Givens v. State,
107 N. E. Rep. 78 (Ind. 1914).
Although there is a considerable conflict in the decisions, the weight of
authority is to the effect that a transaction between a bona fide social club
and one of its members in. dispensing liquors to the member is a sale
within the meaning of that term as it is generally used in statutes regulating
the sale of intoxicating liquors. U. S. v. Alexis Club, 98 Fed. Rep. 725
(&9) ; Martin v. State, 5g Ala. 34 (1877); .Marmont v. State, 48 Ind. 21
(1874); Kentucky Club v. Louisville, 92 Ky. 309 (1891); State v. Easton,
etc.. Club, 73 Md. 97 (189o); State v. Tyndall, 40 Mo. App. 271 (x8go);
Com. v. Jacobs, 152 Mass. 276 (189o) ; People v. Soule, ;f4 Mich. 25o (1889) ;
Newark v. Essex Club, % N. J. L. 99 (iS9o); South Shore Country Club v.
People, 228 IlL 75 (1907); State v. Johns, 14o Ia. 125 (i9o8); County of
Aida v. Boise Commercial Club, 20 Ida. 421 (1917). Other courts have
taken the position that such a transaction is nothing more than an equitable
mode by which the cost of *liquors used by the club is divided among its
members in proportion to the quantity each uses, and that therefore it is
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not a sale within the purview of the statutes regulating the sale of liquors.
Barden v. Montana Club, xo MonL 330 (i8gi) ; State v. McMaster, 35 S. C.
i (i89r); Piedmont Club v. Cor., 87 Va. 54o (i891); State v. Adelphl
Club. 149 N. Y. 5 (1896); Klein v. Livingston Club, 177 Pa. 224 (1896);
Coin. v. Smith, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 474 (1896); Moriarity v. State, 122 Tenn.
44o (i9o9); State v. Colonial Club, 154 N. C. 177 (191o); Corn. v. Krotzer,
51 Pa. Super. Ct. 41t (1912).
The rule seems to be universal, however, that a club organized ostensibly
for social or other purposes, but actually as a device or subterfuge to evade
the laws regulating the sale of liquors will be held strictly accountable, and
where liquors are furnished under such circumstances it will be considered
a sale. Corn. v. Ewig, 145 Mass. x19 (1887); Coin. v. Tierney. 148 Pa. 552
(04.)2) : Com. v. Pefferman, 2 Pa. Super. Ct. 2o2 (1899); Matter of Lyman,
28 N. Y. App. Div. 127 (1898); State v. City Club, 83 S. C. 59 (i9o9);
People v. Craig, i55 Ill. App. 73 (191o); State v. Calhoun, 57 W. Va. 666
(191o).
Of course the question as to whether or not the organization is a
device to evade the law is a question for the jury. Corn. v. Tierney, supra.
CRIMINAL PR0C.}t'RE-CONDLcT op PROSECUTING ATTORNEY--One Drumgoole and the defendant conspired to commit a robbery. In carrying out
their plan. one of them killed a woman. On the trial of the defendant,
the district attorney stated to the jury that Drumgoole had "told of a plan
engineered by Raber and suggested by Cleo to rob". Upon objection by
the defendant's counsel. the district attorney withdrew his remark stating
that the confession could not be used against the present defendant and
asked the jury to -'pay no attention to anything he had stated that Drumgoole had said". Held: Such prompt retraction would, except under extreme
and unusual circumstances, remove the possibility of prejudice. People v.
Raber, 143 Pac. Rep. 317 (Cal. 1914).
Ordinarily, improper remarks by district attorney before the jury are not
ground for reversing a conviction where the court, upon objection, holds
such remarks to be improper, and the counsel withdraws them and apologizes
for them, Sawyer v. U. S., 202 U. S. i5o (19o5); or where the trial court
promptly reprimands the attorney and instructs the jury to disregard such
remarks. People v. Smith, i8o N. Y. 125 (Igo4); People v. Mathews, 139
Cal. 527 (19o3).
The reason for the rule appears to be that if every
remark made by counsel outside of testimony were ground for reversal,
comparatively few verdicts would stand, since, in the ardor of advocacy and
the excitement of trial even the most experienced counsel are occasionally
carried away by this temptation. Dunlop v. U. S., 165 U. S. 498 (1896).
DAM.AGES-MENTAL" ANGLisn-DELAY iN TRANSMIaSSION OF MESSAGEThe negligent delay in the transmission of a message announcing the death
of the addressee's mother prevented hini from arriving in tinie to participate in the arrangements for the funeral. Held: The telegraph company
is liable in damages for the mental anguish suffered by the addressee during
the time he was delayed. Albrook v. Western Union Tel. Co., x5o N. AV.
Rep. 75 (Iowa, 1914).
The decision in the principal case is in accord with the minority doctrine
which holds telegraph companies liable for mental suffering caused by
the delay or non-delivery of messages. So Relle v. Western Union TeL Co.,
5 Tex. 308 (188i): Middleton v. Western Union Tel. Co., 62 So. Rep. 7"44
(Ala. 1913). In order to prevent a superabundance of litigation, the courts
following this rule have adopted numerous limitations and qualifications, by
no means uniform and frequently arbitrary and ill-defined. Western Union
Tel. Co. v. McCaul, 115 Tenn. 99 (i9o5); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Ayers, 131 Ala. 391 (19O1).
Some courts hold that the rule should be
limited to cases where the message relates to sickness or death, Vestern
Union Tel. Co. v. Sledge, 153 Ala. 291 (9o7), and only where the parties
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are closely related. Lee v. Western Union Tel. C6., 13o Ky. 2o2 (i9o8).
Other courts hold that the doctrine applies not only to messages relating to
illness or death, but to all matters of a personal and social character as
It is fairly
well. I)ayvis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 139 N. C. 79 (19os).
well settled that there can he no recovery for mental anguish unless the
company had notice in some way that a negligent delay in transmission
would be likely to cause suffering. Bowers v. Western Union Tel. Co.,
135 N. C. 504 (10o4) ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kibble, xi5 S. W. Rep. 643
But the fact that the message on its face relates to a matter
(Tex. 19o9.
of sickness or death is ordinarily regarded as sufficient to charge the company with notice that someone is likely to endure mental anguish from its
delay or non-delivery, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Moxley, 8o Ark. 5-4
(9o6) ; I. les Y. Western Union Tel. Co., 77 S. C. 174 (19o6); although
it may not be sufficient to charge the company with notice that mental pain
will result to the particular person appearing as plaintiff. Western Union
Tol. Co. v. Potts. 12o Tenn. 37 (19o7); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Luck,
91 Tex. 178 (1897).
Contra to thle rule of the principal case. the majority of jurisdictions hold
that damages are not recoverable where the only injury resulting from the
negligent delay in the delivery of a telegram is mental suffering. Western
Union Tel. Co. v. Burris, 179 Fed. Rep. 92 (1go) ; Corcoran v. Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., 142 Pac. Rep. -9 (Wash. 1914) ; 63 U. oF P. L R. 137.
deed
CIRCu'MSTA.NCFE--A
DocuMENTS-SUSPICIOUS
E'it-,.msE-ANcIENT
offered in evidence as an ancient document was over thirty years old and
came from proper custody, but had never been acknowledged nor recorded,
nor had the party offering it ever gone into possession of the part of the
dcscril,cd itimit which Aas the subject of litigation. Furthermore, the
];LI
alleged grantor had been called to testify in court but had not been asked
to testify as to the deed. Held: The deed was properly excluded. Central
InlIL-ina Ry. v. McMains, 1o7 N. E. Rep. 88 (Ind. 1914).
The ground upon which the admission of ancient documents of any kind
is usually justified. is the difficulty of procuring other or better evidence.
-Northrop v. Wright, 24 Wend. 221 (N. Y. 1840). It is quite generally held
that such a document may not be suspicious in appearance. Hill v. Nisbet,
:S Ga. ;&4 ( 1877) . whether the suspicious nature be apparent oil its face or
is shown l)y some fact directly connected with it. Williams v. Conger, 49
But mere unusual form. Hill v. Lord, 48 'Me. 83 (i86i);
Tex. 582 (iSR78).
nor a cancelled indorsement, Holt v. Maverick, 5 Tex. Civ. App. 65o (1893) ;
nor mutilation. Roe v. Kemmis, 9 Cl. & F. 749 (Eng. 1843), need necessarily
give rise to suspicion that will warrant exclusion. In the principal case the
court seemed to ground its ruling on the cumulative weight of all the suspicious circumstances enumerated. So far as possession under the deed is
concerned, the trend of authority both in England and America is to repudiate
the necessity of such possession. Bristow v. Cormican, L R. 3 App. Cas.
641. 68 (1878) ; and especially if there are other corroborative facts. Walker
v. Walker. 6;7 Pa. 185 (t87o); Applhgate v. Lexington Min. Co., 117 U. S.
The fallacy of requiring proof of possession in such cases is
255 (16).
pointed out in 3 \Vigmore on Evid.. §2141. Though in excluding the docu- iment entirely as suspicious the court is probably in line with the weight of
authority, when suspicious arise from extraneous testimony there is some
authority for admitting the document and allowing the jury to pass upon its
genuineness. Williams v. Conger, supra.
OLt.'YrARv C1ARAcTr-The accused, while in.
EvNLxc-E(CONEssiosoN
cutody in tl.e office of tile prosecutor, was confronted by his wife and his
daughter. the accucer. and was kept there and questioned continuously for
nearly three hours, and urged to confess. Night came and he was left alone
with an trader-sheriff, who told the accused that if he would confess his wife
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might forgive him. Held: The confession made at that time is inadmissible.
People v. Prestige, 148 N. W. Rep. 347 (Mich. 1914).
-The court in this case adopts the prevailing view that when the accused
is brought into a highly nervous or excited state by questioning or other
external agencies, his confession is involuntary and inadmissible. State v.
Thomas, 250 Mo. t89 (1913): People v. Borello, 16i Cal. 367 (i9ui). As to
just what circumstances or inducements will render a confession involuntary, a multitude of cases have arisen and the decisions are by no means
uniform. The general rule is that the inducements in order to disqualify
must be held out by some one in authority over the prosecution or the custody of the accused, Roesel v. State. 62 N. J. L. 216 (1898); U. S. v.
Stone, 8 Fed. Rep. 232 (1881); and must in general relate to the manner
of prosecution or the condition of the accused while in custody. People v.
Johnson, 41 Cal. 453 (1871); Com. v. Curtis. 97 Mass. 574 (1867). Such
inducements are to be distinguished from offers of merely collateral benefits
or favor, which do not disqualify. Cox v. People, 8o N. Y. 500 (188o). Thus
in the principal case the hope of forgiveness by the wife of the accused
as held out by the officer, though apparently given some weight by the
court, is clearly within the rule regarding collateral benefits and of no
effect. In harmony with the spirit permitting collateral promises, it is
universally held that no trick or fraud employed in securing a. confession
will render it inadmissible, as where a detective pretended to be a fellowprisoner, Burton v. State, io7 Ala. o8 0894); or where one pretended
to be an accomplice of the accused, Stone v. State. io5 Ala. 6o Q1894);
and this has even been extended to the case where the accused is furnished liquor by the officer until he becomes talkative. People v. Ramirez,
Confessions obtained by violence have never been
5 Cal. 533 (88o).
admitted, and those made under threat of mob violence are clearly inadmissible as being in a sense not mentally directed by the accused. Edmonson v. State; 72 Ark. 585 (19o4). Advice that accused "had better tell the
truth" would seem on principle not to vitiate a confession, because by
hypothesis the worst it can evoke is the truth and there is no risk of accepting a false confession. x Wigmore on Evid., §832. In England and in
many American jurisdictions such a confession is excluded. Reg. v. Enoch,
5 C. & P. 539 (Eng. 1833); People v. Barrie, 49 Cal. 342 (1874). In several American jurisdictions it is admitted. State v. Robinson, 23 S. W.
Rep. io66 (Mo. 1893). The justification of the former view would seem
to be that the exhortation to tell the truth operates on the mind of the
accused as an exhortation to confess what the prosecutor suspects. No
amount of religious exhortation or pressure will invalidate a confession,
since it is rather regarded as making for truth. Reg. v. Gilham, i Mood.
See Chamberlayne. Evidence, §1480 ff.
Cr. C. 186 (Eng. 18.8).
Though the confessions obtained under prohibited pressure are inadmissible, the facts discovered in consequence of them are universally admitted.
Warickshall's Case, I Leach. Cr. L. (3d ed.) 298 (Eng. 1783); and the prevailing rule is that it may be shown that the facts were discovered through
information given by the accused. Beery v. U. S., 2 Colo. 186 (1873). Some
courts admit such part of the confession itself as corroborated by facts
subsequently discovered. Laros v. Com., 84 Pa. 2oo (1877); Whitney v.
Com., 74 S. W. Rep. 237 (Ky. 1903). If probability of truth is the criterion.
the corroboration by facts of a part of the confession, would seem good
ground for admitting it in its entirety.
EvIDENcE-DIScLosURE

TO AND EXAMINATION BY PHYSICIAN-STATUITORY

PROTECTION TO PATIENT--WAIVER OF PRIVILEGE-An Arizona statute, Rev. Stat.
1901, §2535, forbids physicians and surgeons to disclose professional information. In an action for personal injuries, the plaintiff testified as to his
physical condition. Held: The patient's voluntary testimony does not operate
as a waiver of the privilege conferred upon him by the statute. Arizona
& N. M. R. Co. v. Clark, 235 U. S. 669 (x91).
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At common law, communications between physician and patient were
not privileged. Duchess of Kingston's Trial. 2o Howard St. Tr. 573 (Eng.
1776); Rex v. Powell, i C. & P. 97 (Eng. 1823). In most American jurisdictions, however, statutes have been enacted which prohibit the disclosure
by physicians and surgeons of knowledge obtained by personal examination
of the patient or of communications made to the physician by the patient,
without the latter's express consent. When this privilege is waived by the
patient, is a question that has been answered differently by different courts.
One line of statutes and judicial decisions, following the New York rule,
hold that the disclosure by the party in his pleadings in a suit at law, or
in his testimony, of the details of his physical condition, operates as a
waiver of the privilege. Capron v. Douglass, 193 N. Y. ii (I908); Epstein
v. Penna. R. Co., 250 Mo. 1 (1913); Forrest v. Portland R. light Co., 64
Or. 24o (1913). Mr. Justice Hughes, in the dissenting opinion in the principal case, regards the view of these courts as the better one.
The majority opinion, voiced by Mr. Justice Pitney, is in strict accord
with the line of authorities which hold that the patient should be protected from the physician's testimony even when the former voluntarily
testifies with reference to his condition. Williams v. Johnson, 112 Ind.
273 (1887); Green v. Nebagamain, 113 Wis. 508 (xgoa). The decision in
the principal case is grounded upon a strict construction of the language
of the Arizona statute. and upon the thought that the reason for the privilege is the fact that ordinarily the patient does not stand on equal terms
with the physician during the medical examination, the former being more
or less helpless while the latter is in the full possession of his faculties.
But see 4 Wigmore on Evidence, Ed. 1904, §2389.
Evn)ENca-PRESUtnPTIoN-CHARAcTER-In a criminal case, where no evidence is offered in regard to the character of the defendant, there is no
presumption that his character is good which can be considered by the jury
as evidence, Price v. United States, 218 Fed. Rep. 149 (1914); though the
law does presume the good character of the accused, this presumption is
not to be considered as evidence in favor of the accused. Chambliss v.
United States, 218 Fed. Rep. 15 (1914).
The universally accepted rule of law is that the character of the defendant on trial for crime shall not be attached unless he himself puts his
character in issue. Reg. v. Rowton, 1o Cox Cr. C. 25 (Eng. i86S); State
v. Beatty, 62 Kan. 266 (1900); Ware v. State, 91 Ark. 555 (1909). This
procedural rule has frequently been paraphrased into language appropriate
to the law of presumptions. and the courts have been misled into recognizing a "presumption of good character", as the court did in Chambliss v.
United States, supra. People v. Gleason. 122 Cal. 370 (1898); Ackley v.
People. 9 Barb. 6og (N. Y. 185o). In Mullen v. United States, xo6 e.
Rep. 892 (190t), where the question was squarely raised, it was decided that
the character of the accused is presumed to be good. The correct doctrine,
consistent with principle and authority, is that followed by the ourt in
Price v. United States, supra. If the defendant does not place his character in issue by producing evidence himself, it is wholly outside the case,
and there is no presumption as to the defendant's character being good or
bad, and neither court nor counsel can properly allude to the character
of the accused as an element to be considered by the jury. Addison v.
People, 193 Ill. 405 (19o); Griffin v. State, 165 Ala. 29 (igog); State v.
Smith, 5o Kan. 69 (1892).
The so-called presumption of good character, which is apparently an
offshoot of the more general presumption of innocence, is properly classed
by a recent text-writer among the pseudo presumptions. 2 Chamberlayne on
Fvidence, §ii6.

RECENT CASES

--
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FAI.SE lt.rRIsoNME\-T-DETENTION IN COAL MINE-A miner went down

into a coal mine to work for a fixed time. before the expiration of which
he stopped work and demanded to be carried to the surface at once. This
was refused and the miner was detained in the mine for two and one-half
hours, Hield: The defendant company should not be liable for false imprisonment. Herd v. Weardale Steel, Coal and Coke Co., iII L. T. Rep.
666 (Enig. 1914).

False imprisonment is the wrongful interference with the personal
liberty of another. No actual physical harm to the plaintiff is necessary.
Homer v. Battyn, Buller, N. P., 62 (Eng. 1!38) ; Comer v. Knowles. 17 Kans.
there is
436 (877); Martin v. Houck, 141 N. C 317 (1906). Though
nearly always- force, or threats of force or violence, on the part of the
defendant, the general rule is that there need not be. So it is enough if
the plaintiff is led to believe that the defendant has the right to detain
him. Whitman v. Atchison, etc., R. Co., 85 Kans. Iso (t911). Some courts,
however, take the narrow view that some show of force must be presented
Payson v. Macorber, 3 Allen. 69 (Mass. 1861), though of course there need
be no actual resistance, and submission may be shown in any way whatever.
Ilomner v. Battyn, supra; Jones v. Jones, 13 Iredell. 448 (N. Car. 1852);
Browning v. Rittenhouse, 4o N. J. L. 230 (1878). In all cases there must
be the intent to detain or imprison the plaintiff, Wood v. Cummings, 197
Mass. 8o (19o8), and if the act and intent be proved, the defendant is liable
irrespective of any malice or culpability on his part, as where the defendant makes an arrest under a defective warrant, Frazier v. Turner, 76 Wis.
562 (i89o), or where a sheriff seizes a vessel under a statute later declared
unconstitutional, Campbell v. Sherman, 35 Wis. 103 (1874).
To relieve the defendant of responsibility therefor the court in the
principal case was compelled to find that the miner had no right to demand
transportation to the surface, which it did from the terms of the relationship and by relying on the maxim volenti non fit injuria, despite the provisions of the Coal Mines Regulation Act, 50 & 51 Vict., c. 58 (1887), that
mine-owners be compelled to provide access to the surface. See the somewhat similar case of Robinson v. Balmain New Ferry Co., [igxo] App. Cases,
295 (Eng.).

FEDERAL EMiPLOYERs' LIABILITY AcT-AcTioN FOR BENEFIT OF NON-RESIDENr ALIE-An action was brought in behalf of alien parents, residing in
Great Britain, to recover for the negligent death of their son under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Held: The alienage is no bar to recovery.
McGovern v. Phila. & Reading R: R. Co., 235 U. S. 389 (1914).
The District Court in this case had held that the act was not intended
to apply to aliens and so denied recovery, 2o9 Fed. 975 (1914). The court
based its decision on the authority of Deni v. Pennsylvania R. R. Co., 181
Pa. 525 (1897), in which it was held that a non-resident was not entitled
to sue under the Pennsylvania Wrongful Death Act of x855. The court

emphasized the beneficial element in the act and considered that the beneficial elements of it were not intended to be extended to non-residents.
The Supreme Court in reversing the judgment of the District Court

considered the weight of authority as opposed to the Pennsylvania rule in
the Deni Case. supra. and as being in favor of allowing recovery by aliens
under similar acts. Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266 (igoo) ; Kellyville Coal
Co. v. Petraytis, 195 I1. 217. (7902); Atchison T. & S. F. R. R. Co. v.
have
Fajardo, 74 Kan. 314 (i9o6). The court admitted that a statute could other
of
no extra territorial effect as far as placing duties on residents
states, but saw no objection to giving extra territorial effect to beneficial
provisions of such an act as was here in question. The Supreme Court laid
more emphasis on the punitive element of the act, holding that "Its purpose
is something more than to compensation for the negligence of railroad companies", and that this element of the act should be enforced no matter who
were the beneficiaries.
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FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES-SLa5I.UENT PtRcdv.vas-A merchant made
a general- assignment for the benefit of creditors, which assignment was
void on its face. Thereafter the assignee, with the knowledge, consent and
acquiescence of his assignor, sold the stock of goods to an innocent purchaser for value. Held: The puichaser acquired a good title to the propcrty, not only as against tile original assignor, but also as against his subsequently attaching creditors. 'Greene v. Robbins, i5o N. W. Rep. 561 (N. D.

1914).

.

This decision is in accord with the universal rule that a bona fide purchaser of property from a previous grantee to whom it had been conveyed
for the purpose of defrauding creditors is entitled to protection against the
claims of those who were intended to he defrauded by the first conveyance. Quirk v. Thomas. 6 Mich. 76 (1858) ; Williamson v. Russell, 39 Conn406 (1872) ; Phelps v. Morrison, 25 N. J. Eq. 538 (1874) : Simms v. Morse. 2
F-ed. Rep. 325 (188o) : Wilson v. Marion, 147 N. Y. 589 (T895). A bona
fide purchaser from a fraudulent vendee takes a good title. Green v.
Tanner. 49 Mass. 411 (1844): O'Neil v. Patterson. 52 111. App. 26 (1893);
Varnum v. Behn. 63 App. Div. 570, affirming 175 N. Y. 522 (19o3); Boyer
v. Meimer. 2o4 Pa. -"9; (1903).
In order to constitute one a bona fide purchaser there must he valuable
consideration actually passed or secured before notice of the fraud. A verbal
proinice to pay is not enough. Dixon v. Htill. 5 Mich. 404 (1838). Nor is a
pre-existing debt sufficient consideration. Bank v. Dorsey. I Freem. Chan. 338
(Miss. 1843).
The question of bona fides is of course for the jury. Wickham v. Beruick Store Co., 47 Pa. Super. Ct. 176 (1911). A creditor who assails a convcsarce of his debtor for fraud must show it affirmatively. It cannot be
prc-umed. Elliott v. Stoddard. 98 Mass. 145 (1867): Pennington v. Flock,
93 Ind. 378 (184); Shroeder v. Walsh, 120 III. 403 (1887): Allen v. Smith.
120o V. S. 465 (0%)) : Briggs v. Brown, 23 Pa. Super. Ct. 163 (19o3). But a
preponderance of the evidence would seem to be sufficient. Shroeder v.
Walsh. sup ra: Russell v. }luiskamp. 77 Ia. 727 (1889); Laird v. Davidson,
iz4 Ind. 412 (I1,)9). The purchaser must be shown to have actual notice
of the fraud alleged. To !.-ow that he had a suspicion is not enough.
Simms v. Morse, supra.
INJI.'NCtTION-CRIMINAL PcrIx-DxINs-An injunction was granted to restrain criminal proceedings in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and to
present irreparable injury to property. Zweigart v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry, 170
S. W. Rep. i94 (Ky. 1914).
The rule has been broadly laid down that the exercise of the power of
courts of equity is restricted to civil and property rights and that therefore
to interfere in criminl proceedlings is beyond their jurisdiction. Harkrader
Paulk v. Cy. of Sycamore. 1o4 Ga. 2.
v. Wadlev. 172 U. S. 148 ( i8);
t 1 ): McLaughlin v. Jones, 3 W. N. C. -03 (Pa. 1876): and such proceedings are regarded as absolutely void and parties arrested for violation
of such injunctions are discharged on habcas corpus. In rc Sawyer, 124 U. S.
Where the situation in the principal case arises, however, the
2oo (888).
courts are confronted with the alternative of leaving irremediable an inequitable situation or encroaching upon the field of criminal law and risking the charge of "go~erning bv injunction". In such cases the great weighr
of modern authority is to the effect that equitable relief will be granted.
But in
Camden Ry. Co. v. Cy. of Catlettsburg. 129 Fed. Rep. 421 (i9o4).
such cases the interference is founded solely upon the necessity of preserving property rights. Dobbins v. Cy. of Los Angeles, 25 Sup. Ct Rep. t8
: ligh on Injunctions (4th cd.) §68. There is. however, some author(o
it% for confining equitable interference in such cases to actions strictly civil.
6ld Dominion Co. v. Powers. 14o Ala. 22o (904): Portis v. Fall, 34 Ark 375
A criminal proceeding will not be enjoibied merely because based on
(89).

RECENT CASES
the same wrongful act, as an action in equity, unless the objects sought are
identical. Saull v. Browne, L. R. to -Chanc. 64 (1874) ; but where a suit has
already been begun in equity, equity may enjoin a criminal proceeding to test
the same right. In re Sawyer, supra. See also: Kerr on Injunctions ( 5 ited.) 8.
Lti i:.-ELEM -NTs-Coxn~i'ot.S, PRIViLE(;-Haviug published from da.
to clay in their ne\xspaper an account of proceedings before a board investigating tax as.essments, the defendants commented editorially upon these proceedings. In the article the professional conduct and integrity of tile plaintiff,
an attorney, who had appeared before the board, was attacked in an unwarrantably vindictive manier. It was proved that the plaintiff's conduct bad not
been entirely beyond reproach. lleld: The conditional privilege of the defendants is forfeited. Williams v. Hicks Printing Co., i~o N. W. Rep. 183
(Wis. 1914).
Forfeiture of the conditional privilege to which the defendants were
entitled, since the matter was of public interest, was based on !he ground
that the words used indicated malice in fact. The well-known general rule
applied in cases of defamation is that malice in fact-express malice-need
not be proved: that from the mere publication of the defamatory words legal
malice is inferred. Astruc v. Star Co.,
-82Fed. Rep. 705 (1910); Newell on
Slander and Libel (3rd ed.) §401. But where the circumstanues of publication are such as to give rise to conditional privilege, this "presumption" of
malice ceases and the publisher is liable ony on proof of express malice.
llemniens v. lalstead, 138 N. Y. App. 517 (1893) ; Fahr v. Hayes, So N. J.
L. 275 (i888). The principal case, in approving these principles, seemed to find
express malice from intrinsic evidence-the violence of the defendant's language. See Odgers on Libel and Slander (4th ed.), p. 323; Astruc v. Star
Co.. supra. As to the vords in question coming within the privileged realm
of "fair comment" the court said: "It [fair criticism] does not extend to
false statements of fact or unjust inferences nor taunts nor contemptuous
and insulting phrases." As to the latter part of the statement it would seem
that a more liberal view is expressed in Merivale v. Carson. 20 Q. B. D. 275
(Eng. 1877). where the test laid down was whether any fair man, however
prejudiced he might he and however obstinate his views, would have made
the criticism in question.
The decision in the principal case, however,
alppears to have been based o the presence of express malice. Howe v.
Thompson. 15o X. W. Rep. 3ol (S. D. 1914) is a recent case in accord on
the question of malice. An interesting situation arises when the author of
an article, otherwise privileged, is actuated by express malice and the author
and the printer, who published the article, are stied. It is then held that the
author and printer are jointly liable. Smith v. Streatfield, IO9 L. T. Rep.
173 (Eng. 1913). For discussion of the case see 62 U. OF P. L R. 571 and
27 HA v. L. R. 93.
MADA.tus-Rw, iT TO ISSUANCE OF WRIT-The petitiolier brought proceedings to obtain a writ of mandamus to compel Tillamook City to levy
a tax to obtain funds with which to pay a demand owing by said city to
the petitioner. No demand was made of the City or its Common Council,
who had authority to levy the tax. tIeld: A person seeking a writ to enforce
a private right must show a demand and refusal of the proper parties; therefore this writ will not issue. State ex rel. Warren Construction Co. v.
Beals, i44 Pac. Rep. 678 (Ore. 1914).
In order to show that the respondent is in default in cases where a
private right is sought to be enforced by mandamus, the petition must as a
rule allege that performance of the duty has been demanded of the respondent
and that he has refused or failed to perform it. Redenius v. Waggenson.
140 Wis. 265 (19o9): Orsinger v. State Board of Health, 172 111. App. 428
(1912); Ex Parte Virginia Commissioners, 112' U. S. 177 (1884).
Refusal
may be either in direct terms or by conduct from which a refusal can be
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conclusively inferred. U. S. v. BoUtwell, 17 Wall. 604 (U. S. 1873). But
if the duty in question involves an exercise of discretion, it must appear
that the refusal is not justifiable on the ground of discretion. Buggeln v.
Doe, 78 Pac. Rep. 367 (Ariz. i9o4) ; Scott v. Grote, 43 Fla. 396 (igox).
Although some of the older cases lay down the broad rule that a
demand and refusal must be shown before a mandamus will issue to enforce
a public right. Leonard v. louse. 15 Ga. 473 (1854), the weight of authority
isthat in cases where such right is sought to be enforced, no demand need
be alleged. Middleton v.Commissioners of Allegheny Co., 37 Pa. 237 (186o) ;
Conklin v. Cunningham. 38 Pac. Rep. 170 (N. M. 1894). Thus no demand
is necessary before bringing mandamus to compel the board of road cominissioners to exercise its judgment in the matter of repairing streets. State
v. Board of Revenue and Road Com'rs, 61 So. Rep. 368 (Ala. 1913).

In

respect of a public duty, the law itself stands in plac¢ of a demand, and the
neglect or omission to perform the duty stands in the place of a refusal,
for the purpose of enforcing the performance of the duty by mandamus.
People ex rel. Peair v. Board of Education, 127 11. 613 (1889).
N ss:--REQUl1Snl'Es-Certain electors signed a statement of consent to
the sale of liquors, using only the initials of their Christian names. On the
poll lists the Christian names of these electors appeared in full. Held: As
the names differed from those on the poll lists. it was proper not to count
them. Riley-v. Litchfield, iso N. W. Rep. 81 (Ia. 1914).
In early times the Christian name was deemed of far greater importance than the surname. Thus Coke writes: "Special heed be taken of the
name of baptism for that a man cannot have two names of baptism as he
may have divers surnames.- Co. Litt. 3 a. [m]. It is quite generally
accepted that the law knows but one Christian name and that the insertion
or omission of a middle name or initial is immaterial. Keene v. Meade,
2.8 U. S. I (1830); Bratton v. Seymour, 4 Watts, 329 (Pa. 1835); Jackson

v. Sands,

2

Johns. Cas. 267 (N. Y. 18ot).

But -in Massachusetts the opposite

view is taken, Com. v. MeAvoy, 82 Mass. 235 (186o) ; and under the recording laws, Pennsylvania. in Crouse v. Murphy, 140 Pa. 335 (1891), holds the

same. It i%.in general, not presumed that single letters preceding surnames
are not the full Christian names of the persons designated, Ferguson v.
Smith, 1o Kan. 36 (1872): and the use of initials is generally held sufficient. Jones's Estate, 27 Pa. 336 (1856). Thus a judgment is not rendered
invalid by the use of initials of Christian name. Gottlieb v. Alton Grain
Co.. 87 App. Div. 38o (N. Y. 19o3). To this rule there is, however, a well
establi.hed exception in the case of service on parties by publication, where
initials are held insufficient. Riffle v. Ozark Land & Lumber Co., 93 Mo. App.
41 (1902); the reason for this exception being well stated in Whitney v.
Masemnore. it L. R. A. 676 (Kan. 1o7). But in a few cases initials have
been held insuflicient when the reason therefor is less obvious. Frank v.
l.cvie. -8 N. Y. Sup. Ct. ;99 (1866). It is held that one may be designated
in proceedings by the namre by which he is commonly known. Corn. v.
Trainor, 123 Mass. 414 (1877) ; and if commonly known by several names,
he may be designated by any one of them. Schofield v. Jennings, 68 Ind.
As pointed out in the principal case, where the error is merely
232 (1879).
in spelling, the well-known doctrine of idem sonans applies. Com. v. Stone,
io3 Mass. 421 (I869).
NlSA.xCF-KEEPIuv, ExLosivxs-The lessee of a room in an 6ffice building kept quantities of dynamite there without the lessor's knowledge or
consent. The dynamite exploded and demolished the structure. Held:
Although no negligence was alleged or proved, the jury were warranted in
finding that the.e facts constituted an actionable nuisance. Forster v. Rogers
Bros., 247 Pa. 54 (rgzS).

RECENT CASES
Although it has heen held that it is a prerequisite to liability for an
explosion that there should have been negligence in the keeping of the
explosives in question. Cook & Co. v. Anderson, 85 Ala. 99 (1887), an examination of the authorities leads to the conclusion that the factor of carelessness or negligence is immaterial where a nuisance, either public or private
exists. and the party so storing the articles in question will be liable for all
damages occasioned by the explosion thereof even though he may not be
guilty of negligence. Laflin & R. Powder Co. v. Turney, 13t Ill. 322 (189o);
Marine Ins. Co. v. St. Louis,' Iron Mountain & Southern R. Co., 41 Fed. Rep.
643 (1890).
But. on the other hand, as was pointed out in the principal case the mere
possession and storage of dynamite for a lawful purpose in a neighborhood
where people reside are not per se a nuisance, but that the attending circumstances may so constitute them. In this connection, the locality is of primary
importance and evidence of the proximity of buildings and highways and
the density of the population near the place where the explosive is stored is
admissible to show that this actually was a nuisance. Flynn v. Butler, i89
So too a nuisance may exist where the quantity of
Mass. 377 (19o5).
explosive stored is excessive, Ricker v. McDonald, 89 App. Div. 300 (N. Y.
1903), and a limitation imposed by statute as to the amount permitted
makes the excessive storage a nuisance in some jurisdictions, Richer v. McDonald, supra, while in others it is merely evidence that a nuisance existed.
Forster v. Rogers Bros., supra.
PROCEO'RE-ACCOLNT STATFr--Under a contract, there were items of
charge and credit on both sides of the account. An account was acknowledged by the defendants to be a correct statement of the relations between
the parties. Held: An account stated is an acknowledgment of the existing condition of liability between the parties.The plaintiff, however, cannot
recover on an account stated where the evidence shows that it is for an
amount different than that pleaded. Barker Auto Co. v. Bennett, io6 N. E.
Rep. 9o (Mass. 1914).
An account stated is an agreement, express or implied, between the
parties who have had previous transactions with each other, fixing and
determining the amount due from one to the other. Harrison v. Henderson, 72 Pac. Rep. 878 (Kans. 1o3) ; Jorgenson v. Kingsley, 82 N. V. Rep.
It involves a promise to pay a real indebtedness, and a
1o4 (Neb. ipoo).
promise to pay a claim not founded on such an obligation is not conclusive,
and may be shown to he without consideration. Ivy Coal & Coke Co.
Long, 36 So. Rep. 722 (Ala. 1904): Brush & Stephens Co. v. Ross, 99 N. Y
Supp. 796 (t906). The balance due must be definitely fixed-the general
admission of a pecuniary demand not specifying the amount is not an account
stated. Weigel v. Hartman Steel Co., 51 N. J. L. 446 (1889); Bartholomew
v. Sheppherd, 93 S. W. Rep. 218 (Tex. i9o6). However, it is generally
accepted that an account stated need not cover all the dealings on both sides.
The mere fact that one item in an account is disputed does not prevent the
account from becoming an account stated as to all items admitted to be
correct. Mulford v. Caesar, 53 Mo. App. 263 (1893). Likewise, when all
of the items of an account are admitted to be correct, except particular
ones which are left by the parties for future adjustment, the account becomes
stated as to those items which are admitted to be correct. Tuggle v. Minor,
76 Cal. 96 (j888). But see contra, Weigel v. Hartman Steel Co., jupra.
An account stated is not in general conclusive, but only established prima
facie the accuracy and correctness of the items included therein. Peebles
v. Yates, 40 So. Rep. 996 (Miss. roo6). It may be opened for correction
on the ground of fraud, accident or mistake, but the burden is on the party
seeking to impeach the account. Chapman v. Liverpool Salt & Coal Co., 57
W. Va. 395 (1905); Montgomery v. Fritz, 75 N. W. Rep. 266 (N. D. 1898).
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PROPERTY-RIGHT OF WAY-GAT.-The owner of a servient tenement
erected an unlocked gate, which was kept open (luring business hours. acioss

the opening to a private road over which the owner of adjoining property
had a right of way. Held: The owner of the dominant tenement may be
restrained from removing the gate. Pettey v.Parsons, iII L T. Rep. ioit
(Eng. i915).

This decision is in accord with the well-established rule both in England
and America that the rights and obligations in regard to the facilities for
pas.age where a private right of way exists are to be regulated, in the
absence of an express agreement. by the nature of the case and the circum.stances of the time and place. lemphill v. The City of Boston, 62 Mass.
3)5 (3851); Hudson v. Young. 4 Lansing, 63 (N. Y. 1871): Cowling v.
fligginson, 4 Mees. and Wels. 245 (Eng. 1831). Neither the grantor nor the
grantee is obliged to take any active steps unless stipulated in the deed.
Bakeman v. Talbot. 31 N. Y. 366 (1865) ; Brill v. Brill, io8 N. Y. 1i (887):

Sachs v. Cardes. II Ohio C. C. 145 (1896); Oney v. Land Co.. 1o4 Va. s8o
(19o5). On the other hand the grantee is entitled to a reasonable user, Newcoiner v. Coulson. 5 Ch. Div. 133 (Eng. 1877), and the grantor may use the

property in any way not inconsistent with the rights of the grantee.
v. Bordnian.
(Ky. i&88);
Roberts, 119
1874). The

Atkins

2 Met. 457 (Mass. 8g4o); Maxwell v. McAtee. 9 B. Mon. 21
Atty. General v. Williams, 140 Mass. 329 (1885); Hterman v.

. 37 (18o) ; Clifford v.Hoare, L R. 9 C. P. 362 (Eng.
Cowling v. lHigginson, supra;
Hudson v. Young. supra. So the grantor, as in the principal case, may
erect gates, if to do so will not substantially interfere with the reasonable
user of the grantee. Maxwell v. McAtee, supra; McTavish v. Carroll. 7
Md. 352 (1853) : Bean v. Coleman. 44 N. H. 539 (1863) ; Houpes v. Alderson,
22 Iowa. i6x (WR67); Connery v. Brooke, 73 Pa. So (1873); Baker v. Frick,
Even
45 Md. 337 (1876); Preston v. Siebert, 21 App. D. C. 405 (9o3).
if the grant expressly prohibits fences, the right to hang a gate may be
acquired by prescription. Frazier v. Mfeyer, 137 Ind. 71 (1892). But the
light to hang a gate may be lost by a free and unobstructed use of the
way for a prescriptive period. Shivers v.Shivers. 37 X. J. Eq. .;8 (i88o).
N.

question i one for the jury.

PUBLIC SERVICE CORPORATIONs-ELCTRIC STREET L1GnTING BY MUNICTPA.IT\'-APi'ROVAL OF PUBLIC SERVICE Coststlsslox-The Public Service Com-

pany Law of Pennsylvania, 1913, P. L. t374, defines public service companies

inicr alia, electric corporations and also all persons engaged for profit
in the same kind of business. The term "corporation" does not include
municipalities except as expressly provided. The Act does not -Apply to producers of electricity, not otherwise public service companies, using the same
for the sole benefit of themselves or their tenants and not for sale to others.
Art. 1. §1. Art. II1. §3 (d). requires the approval of the Commission for
a ninicipality to acquire and operate a plant to render service to the public

'as,

of a kind already being rendered by a privately owned company.

Held:

A municipality may construct and operate a plant for generating electricity
for the sole purpose of lighting the streets and not for sale to the public,
without obtaining the Commission's approval. Petition of Borough of Gettys1914).
burg: Opin. No. 4i of P. S.Com.of Penna. (Dec..
The Commission classifies such service by a municipality with that
rendered bv the owner of an office building to his tenants from his own
plant. and with, the manufacturer who generates his own power, under
Art. 1, §1, of the Public Service Law. The exemption thereby gained relieves
the municipality from the requirements of Art. III. §3 (d). No authority
exists, the case being one of first instaice. The reasoning proceeds on the
ground that the borough might discontin-ie lighting its streets by electricity
and .uhstiilte caidle,. oil or acetylene gas, and that in installing the substitute the act Aoul not apply. The decision becomes of vast importance.
however. in view of uther and much more far reaching consequences. It is
an utidoubted principle of utility regulatiun that ccmnpetition should not be

RECENT CASES
permitted in a field already occupied by a public service company rendering
adequate service at rates, reasonable and fair. Atlantic Highlands Gas Company Case, I N. J. Com. Rep. No. 3: Consumers Gas Company of Millville
Case, Idem No. o5. But it is frequently true. in small municipalities, that
electric and gas companies cannot operate profitably and give fair rates to
private consumers without the assistance of public lighting contracts with the
municipality. The resultant decrease in revenue from the loss of public
contracts makes it impossible to maintain an adequate service at fair rates
for private customers. When therefore a municipality takes advantage of the
principle of the Gettysburg case and later applies for permission to furnish
the service to its inhabitants, the principle of the Atlantic Highlands Case
is not applicable. and the approval should be granted. Phillipsburg Light,
Heat & Power Company Case, N. J. Com. (February 3, 1914). This precise
result was reached in the Village of Bath Case, P. S. Com. and D. N. Y.
(October 14, 1914). The decision of the Pennsyvania Commission marks
the entering wedge for the destruction of many small electric companies by
municipal competition.
TORTs-INTRFERENCE WITH EMPLovMENT-The defendants. 'acting for a
trade union, compelled their employers to discharge the plaintiffs and to
refuse to give them any further employment unless they should become
members of the defendants' union on such terms as the latter might choose
to impose. Held: The defendants acted, in contemplation of law, from
malice toward plaintiffs and equity would grant relief. Fairbanks v. McDonald, io6 N. F. Rep. 1oo (Mass. 1914).
As a general proposition, if one induces another to violate his contract
with a third person, he commits an actionable tort. Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B.
D. 333 (:88i) ; Doremus v. Hennessy. 1,6 Il1.6o8 (1898) ; Berry v. Donovan,
188 Mass. 353 (igo). The contractual relation of master and servant is
that with reference to which the rule is most frtequently invoked. Lumley
v. Gye, 2 El. & B1. 216 (Eng. 1853) ; Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225 (1883) ;
Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578 (i893). The effect of the rule is to permit
an employer, whose employee has been induced by a third person to break
his contract of employment, to maintain an action against such third person
for inducing the breach. Brown Hardware Company v. Indiana Stove Works,
96 Tex. 45.3 (igo.3); Employing Printers Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga.
509 (t9o5). And a servant has a cause of action against one who procures
his discharge from his master's service. Hollenbech v. Ristine, 114 Ia. 358
(i9go): Gibson v. Fidelity Co.. 232 IIl. 49 (i9o8). And this though the
term of service interrupted is not for a fixed period. Lucke v. Clothing
Cutters, 77 Md. 396 (1893): Berry v.Donovan. 188 Mass. 353 (IgoS). The
plaintiff must show, however, that the breach complained of resulted from
the defendants' interference. Sunnyside Co. v. Read, 71 Ark. 59 (1903).
And in order to sustain the action it is necessary to show that special damage resulted from the interference producing the breach. Bowen v. Hall,
supra: London Guarantee Co. v. Horn, jot Ill. App. 355 (1902). But it has
been held that the fact that actual damage may not be ascertainable does
not defeat the right to the recovery of at least nominal damages. Chipley
v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 2o6 (1887).
The courts differ as to the question of malice. Several cases lay down
the rule that intentional interference with a contract right, without lawful
justification is malicious in law, even if it is done from good motives and
without express malice. Barr v. Essex Trades Council, s3 N. J. Eq. ioi
(1894); Holder v. Cannon Mfg. Co., 135 N. Car. 392 (igo4). In another
line of cases, it is held that the interference may be unlawful solely on
:L'contnt of the motive 'Which actuates it. Temperton v. Russell. [1893] 1
Q. B. 715 (Eng.); Nashville, ec.. R- Co. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. Rep. 65
(1897). A doctrine which is supported by a respectable line of authorities
is to the effect that an act which is not in itself unlawful does not become
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actionable solely because done maliciously and that an interference producing the breach of a contract is actionable only when the means of interfcrence employed are such as to constitute a legal wrong. Boyson v. Thorn,
,,N Cal. 578 188.;) : Walden v. Conn, 84 Ky. 312 (1886).
TRUSTS-STATUTE

OF

FRAL'DnS-TRi'STS

ARISING

BY OPERATION OF

LAW-

An agent employed by parol to purchase certain land, wrongfully contracted
in writing with the vendor to buy in his own name, and paid a deposit.
The principal later tendered the amount of the deposit and the agreed commi.sions. Held: The agent by his fraud became a trustee for his principal
of his interest in the land: and the trust was not within the Statute of
Frauds. llavner Land Co. v. MacGregor, 149 N. XV. Rep. 617 (Ia. 1914).
If an agent with the money of his principal purchase lands in his own
name, there is a resulting trust in favor of the principal, which is expressly
exempted from the Statute of Frauds. Lloyd v. Woods, 176 Pa. 63 (t896).
But where the agent purchases the land with his own money, the cases
exhibit some confusion. It has been declared that parol proof cannot be
received to establish a resulting trust in lands purchased by an agent and
paid for with his own funds, no money of the principal being used for the
)aynent; and the reason given is that the relation of principal and agent
depends upon the agreement existing between them, and the trust in such
a case must arise from the agreement, and not from the transaction; and
where a trust arises from an agreement. it is within the Statute of Frauds,
and mut.t be in writing. Nestol v. Schmid, 29 N. J. Eq. 458 (1878). Many
-,svs hold, however, that as the trust arises from the previously established
nfidential relation, the agent may be charged as trustee upon a trust arisg by implication of law, which is not within the Statute of Frauds. Rose
Hlayden. 35 Kans. Io6 (18816) ; Johnson v.Hayward, 74 Neb. I57 (i9o5).
*his is founded on the doctrine that one holding a fiduciary relation to
.nother u ill be a constructive trustee for the latter as to all property which
isduty as tiluciary requires that lie should acquire for him. The basis of
die doctrine is the fraud of the fiduciary; and as early as 1748 Lord Hard%%icke in Reech v. Kennegal, i Ves. 123 (Eng. 1748), stated that "the court
adhered to the principle, that the Statute of Frauds should never be understood to protect fraud, and therefore whenever a case is infected with fraud,
the court will not suffer the statute to protect it". A trust arising in such
a case, being based on fraud, is constructive rather than resulting, though
"the courts do not always adhere to the strict terminology. Indeed, in the
principal case the court refers to the trust indiscriminately as resulting and
as constructive. By the weight of American authority, a mere parol agreement to purchase land for another does not create such a fiduciary relation that the promisor will be declared a constructive trustee if he purchases for himself with his own money. Mitchell v. Wright, 155 AlaL 458
t fjo8): Lancaster Trust Co. v. Long. 220 Pa. 499 (i9o8). No definite rule
can be laid down as to what further element is necessary to create a constructive trust. In the principal case, the only fraud of the agent was the
fact that he bought for himself, in breach of his agreement to buy for his
principal: he used his own money, and there is no indication of the precise
gain to him in the transaction; nevertheless, as he was employed as an
agent, his conduct was considered to show bad faith sufficient to make him
a trustee. As shown above, there is authority for this view. Indeed, there
i; considerable authority for the doctrine that a parol agreement to purchase for another of itself creates an agency notwithstanding the Statute
of Frauds, and that the unfaithful agent will be declared a constructive
trustee if he purchases on his own account. Koyer v. Willmon, 15o Cal. 785
197) : Johnson v. Hayward, supra.
It is said in Green v. Drummond, 31 Md. 71 (x869), that a trust
cannot be raised on a mere executory contract, where there has been no
convcyance of the legal title. Ifthat be the rule, the principal case is wrong.

RECEXT CASES
There is little authority on the point, but the cases of Lynch v. Herrig,
32 Mont. 267 (19o5). and Currence v. Ward, 43 W. Va. .367 (1897). holdo
ing that an executory contract gives an equitable title which is sufficient
to found a trust, support the principal case. There is no reason why that
should not be so, because it is undoubted that an equitable interest may be
the subject of a trust as well as a legal interest.
WILI.s-OM

IONss.
or DEFAMATORY

WORDS

FRoMs

PROBATE-A

husband

in his will recited words which were slanderous and defamatory of his
wife. The words were not testamentary. field: Upon application of the
widow and the husband's executor, the words will be omitted from the
lrolbte. In the Goods of White, i1 L.T. Rep. 413 (Eng. 1914).
While the decision in the principal case that a will ought not to be
made the medium of slanderous and libellous statements and that such
statements, when not testamentary, will be omitted from the probate,
seems to be the correct rule, it is interesting to note the results of the
four previous English cases upon the subject. In Curtis v. Curtis, 3 Add.
33 (1825), a mere verbal application to strike out from the will the words.
"inconsequence of the cruel and murderous conduct of my wife, in this
illness, as well as in past instances" was refused, even though all the
interested parties consented to the striking out. In. the next case, the
court, while refusing to strike out from the will an "atrocious libel on a
mere stranger, unconnected with the testamentary disposition",- ordered the
libellous matter to be omitted from the probate copy. In the Goods of
Wortnaby, i Rob. 423 (1846). In Marsh v. Marsh, i Sw. & Tr. 528 (186o),
upo1n consent of all parties. certain expressions in a codicil derogatory to
the family of the testator's brother-in-law, were ordered to be excepted from
probate. But where a will contained statements that the wife of the testator's brother was a "wicked and remorseless wife", and had deliberately
defrauded the testator of his patrimony and inheritance by a law suit, the
application to omit these expressions from probate was refused. In the
Goods of Honyword. 25 L T. Rep. N. S. 164 (1871).
Although no adjudicated case can be found in the American reports,
the following statement in Gallagher's Estate, to Pa. Dist. Rep. 733 (igoi):
"It has been suggested that probate of libel may be prevented: that is
conccded if an opportunity he presented in time to act", would seem to be
dictum supporting the view of the principal case. This dictuin, if adopted
by the American courts, may become important as creating a personal liability of the executor for the publication of the libel, since be could not
plead in justitication compulsion of law to libel an innocent party. 62 UNiv.
OF PA. LAw REv. 643, at page 646; Harris v. Nashville Trust Co., 128 Tenn.
573 (1913).
WVORKMEN'S CoMrEnSATION-IN-JURY By Acc1DENT-INj.y FRom VioLF.NCE OF Titian P.Rsox-A teacher in an industrial school was feloniously

assaulted by some of his pupils, and died as a result of the injuries sustained. Held: The death of the schoolmaster was the consequence of an
injury arising out of and in the course of the employment of the deceased.
Board of Management of Trim Joint Dist. School v. Kelly, iitL. T. Rep.
305 (Eng. 1914).

The House of Lords reached the conclusion that the word "accident"
should be taken to include any injury that is not expected or designed by
the workman who has sustained the injury.

It approved the decisions in

Ni.bet v. Rayne and Burn, 103 L T. Rep. 178 (Eng. i9ic), where a paymaster was robbed of his employer's funds and killed, while in the perform:,nce of his duty: Audcrson v. Balfour. 11)10] 2 lr. Rep. 497. where a
gamekeeper while in the discharge of his duties was attacked by a poacher
and killed; and Challis v.London, etc.. Rwy. Co., 93 L. T. Rep. 330 (Eng.
t9o5), where an engineer was killed through the act of a boy who threw
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a stone from a bridge under which a train was passing. The American
decisions touching upon this question are in strict harmony with the view
taken by the ltoue of Lords in the principal case. McNichol v. Patterson,
Wilde & Co.. o2 N. E. Rep. 617 (Mass. 1913); Bryant v. Fissell, 86 At. Rep.
4.;8 ( N J. iot3v : likewi~e in In re Schwenlein. Claim No. 33164. Ohio Indus.
Acc. B3d. ( 1914). where a stenographer was murdered by a discarded suitor,
while she was taking dictation from her employer, and it was held that she
was killed in the course of her employment.
The di.senting opinints hold that no designed injury should be regarded
as an injury by accident. Accord: 'Murray v. Denholm & Co., 48 Scot. L
Rep. 8(,6 (1911). where compensation was not allowed for injuries sustained
by workmen as the result of attacks made by strikers. The tentative draft
of the Pennsylvania Workmen's Compensation Act, §301, provides that no
compensation shall be had for an injury caused by the act of a third person
intended to injure the employee for personal reasons.

